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Executive Summary 
This study examines the legal environment of netting agreements covering financial contracts. It 
concludes  that  an  international  instrument  should  be  developed  capable  of  improving  the 
effectiveness of netting agreements in mitigating systemic risk. To this end, two different aspects 
of  the  enforceability  of  netting  agreements  are  considered:  (i)  the  general  enforceability  of 
netting, and (ii) the possibility of precluding the operation of netting a mechanism by way of a 
regulatory moratorium for considerations of systemic stability. 
The first part of the study presents the use of netting and the various forms it may take before 
going on to explain the benefits and drawbacks of enforceable netting agreements. Benefits for 
individual firms consist in lower counterparty risk and more favourable capital requirements. 
Benefits for the financial market as a whole flow from greater financial market stability since the 
contagion of systemically relevant institutions by the default or insolvency of another institution 
is limited, thus helping to avoid systemic effects. Additionally, the use of netting arrangements 
can improve overall market liquidity.  
A potential drawback of enforceability of netting, in certain situations, is that the operation of a 
netting  mechanism  could  actually  work  against  the  purpose  of  systemic  stability  where  the 
transfer of parts of the business of an insolvent financial institution to a solvent bridge entity 
would enhance or maintain value to a greater extent than the operation of a netting agreement 
would. Regulatory authorities are considering under which conditions a moratorium to halt the 
netting mechanism until the situation is solved could avoid this threat to systemic stability. 
The second part of the study examines whether there is the potential to support the purpose of 
enhanced systemic stability by way of international harmonisation of private and insolvency law. 
As  regards  the  issue  of  general  enforceability,  the  global  picture  of  netting  legislation  is 
heterogeneous. Given the great practical relevance of the matter, an international instrument 
could be very useful. As to the issue of private law consequences of regulatory moratoria, the 
absence of a harmonised framework appears to lead to actual cross-border inconsistency and 
legal uncertainty as regards financial contracts that are governed by a foreign law. Taking these 
to  aspects  into  account,  this  paper  recommends  that  work  on  developing  an  international 
instrument be undertaken. 
The final part of the study suggests a set of preliminary guidelines for the development of such 
an instrument. In the light of the findings of the previous sections, a mixed, two-step approach is 
recommended. First, a non-binding instrument could be developed, serving as a benchmark and 
reservoir of legal solutions in respect of the relevant issues. Secondly, isolated aspects relating to 
both the general enforceability of netting and the accommodation of a regulatory moratorium in 
foreign  private  and  insolvency  law  could  be  dealt  with  in  an  international  Convention,  in 
particular where cross-border situations involving netting require uniformity of applicable legal 
rules.     4 
Introduction 
Financial institutions and other participants in the financial market in their daily operations apply 
a variety of mechanisms designed to reduce their credit risk exposure. First, they use a set of 
arrangements that might be termed 'classical' types of security interest provided by the law and 
widely used in commercial practice, in particular different kinds of personal security interest (e.g. 
'bailment',  'guarantee',  etc.)  or  security  interests  established  over  movable,  immovable  or 
intellectual property (e.g. 'pledge', 'charge', 'hypothec', 'mortgage', 'repo', etc.). In the financial 
market, security interests created over cash, securities or claims exist in a variety of legal setups, 
and  the  legal  arrangements  often  resemble,  at  least  on  the  surface,  the  afore-mentioned 
security interests applied to the world of movables, e.g. pledge of cash, securities or claims. 
The modern financial market, in addition to the techniques listed above, has developed entirely 
new concepts able to reduce market participants’ credit risk exposure, amongst them netting 
arrangements,  i.e.  the  contractual  arrangement  between  counterparties  to  apply  netting  in 
respect of their mutual rights and obligations. The analysis that follows focuses on netting. 
The  notion  of  netting  is  a  relatively  new  addition  to  the  legal  terminology
2  and  it  is  not 
particularly well-defined. Broadly speaking, it is often understood that netting resembles the 
classical concept of set-off known since ancient Roman times. However, netting, especially in the 
form of 'close-out netting', encompasses important additional elements that result in netting 
being considerably different from traditional set-off. 
Example 1: A-Bank and B-Bank do a great deal of business with one another. There are numerous 
mutual payment and delivery obligations (e.g., interest payments, delivery of foreign currencies, 
claims to return of collateral, pledges over securities) resulting from various kinds of financial 
transactions. In order to avoid one party from being infected by the financial problems of the 
other, the parties conclude a netting agreement. Under this agreement, in the event of default by 
either party to meet any of its obligations vis-à-vis the other, all mutual rights and obligations are 
deemed  to  be  immediately  due.  Obligations  in  kind  (delivery  of,  e.g.,  foreign  currency)  are 
transformed  into  a  payment  obligation,  under  a  predetermined  valuation  mechanism.  The 
mutual  rights  and  obligations  are  then  computed  so  as  to  result  in  a  single  net  payment 
obligation of one of the parties to the other party. This is the only obligation that remains to be 
settled. 
Netting  arrangements  are  widely  used  in  the  financial  market  by  private  sector  entities,  in 
particular banks, but also private non-financial institutions. In the public sector, entities such as, 
especially,  central  banks  and  supranational  financial  institutions  such  as  development  banks 
make use of netting arrangements. Regulatory authorities (most recently, the Cross-border Bank 
Resolution Group of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) generally encourage the use 
                                                 
2 In 1989, the predecessor of the Basel Committee issued the so called Angell-Report on netting schemes, 
which  was  probably  the  starting  point  for  the  prevalence  of  the  concept  and  terminology  of  netting. 
Simultaneously, 'netting' started to appear as a concept in legislative acts, albeit very few. Later on, 'close-out 
netting' became widely used under the master agreements provided by market associations, in particular ISDA, 
ICMA, EBF and others, cf. page 6.    5
of such netting arrangements because of their beneficial effects on the stability of the financial 
system.
3 
However, these beneficial effects are particularly palpable in the event of the insolvency of a 
counterparty, always assuming that the legal effects stipulated in the agreement are recognised 
by and enforceable under the applicable insolvency law. The current global status quo, however, 
is that while many jurisdictions recognise netting in insolvency, the extent to which they do so 
and the scope and legal effects differ. Other jurisdictions do not clearly recognise netting, and 
their  legal  practice  often  applies  the  principles  governing  set-off,  not  recognising  the 
fundamental  differences  between  the  two  mechanisms.  There  is  agreement  that  this  global 
'patchwork' is unsatisfactory in cross-border situations. 
First steps have meanwhile been taken towards an international consensus on the principles 
underlying enforceability of netting agreements. The UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules 
for Intermediated Securities ('Geneva Securities Convention') in its Chapter V sets out an optional 
framework  on  the  protection  of  collateral  transactions.  This  protection  extends  to  netting 
agreements  provided  they  are  concluded  as  part  of  a  collateral  transaction,  and  contains  a 
definition of netting and a key rule on enforceability.  
Furthermore,  netting  has  also  been  recognised  in  the  work  of  UNCITRAL  on  cross-border 
insolvency.  Notably,  the  Legislative  Guide  on  Insolvency  Law  refers  to  the  enforceability  of 
netting as a feature to be considered when designing insolvency law, cf. Recommendation 7(g), 
and advises that netting of financial contracts should be allowed under the applicable insolvency 
procedure, cf. Recommendations 101-107.  
Since  the  2007/2009  financial  crisis,  an  additional  aspect  of  the  enforceability  of  netting 
agreements has been highlighted: regulatory authorities, while underlining the usefulness of 
netting, have contemplated the need for a short moratorium on the netting mechanism in pre-
insolvency or insolvency situations affecting a financial institution, so as to allow the regulator 
the time needed to decide if and how to save an ailing entity for reasons of systemic stability. 
Regulatory authorities currently consider that such a moratorium would need to be designed in 
such a way as to prevent the operation of netting agreements in a pre-insolvency situation from 
causing further substantial erosion of the failing entity’s operation. From a private law point of 
view, one of the difficulties is that such a regulatory stay would often extend to rights and 
obligations governed by a foreign law – which illustrates the urgent need for common principles 
explaining how to address these new regulatory powers from the foreign private law standpoint.  
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the two aspects outlined above, so as to enable an 
assessment to be made of the need to harmonise private and insolvency law aspects of netting 
as well as the scope and extent of such harmonisation, and to provide tentative guidance as to 
how an international instrument covering this subject-matter could be shaped.  
                                                 
3 Bank for International Settlements/Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Report and Recommendations of 
the  Cross-border  Bank  Resolution  Group,  March  2010,  http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs162.pdf?noframes=1   6 
1
st Part – Use, benefits and drawbacks of netting 
I.  Netting in today's financial markets 
Netting is widely used in financial markets as a risk mitigation tool. Gross exposures between 
different  market  participants,  for  instance  between  two  financial  institutions  operating 
worldwide, can be enormous. Netting is an instrument that allows the institutions’ risk situation 
to  be  assessed  on  the  basis  of  net  exposure.  This  tool  clearly  has  an  application  in  risk 
management and the calculation of capital requirements, since the net exposure in the event of 
default of the counterparty is often only a small fraction of the gross exposure.  
Against this background, it is obvious why netting is regularly used in certain business areas such 
as  settlement  of  financial  instruments,  high  frequency  trading  between  two  counterparties, 
repurchase transactions and the derivatives business – here, the difference between gross and 
net exposure is particularly high. Yet netting is also used in other business areas, e.g. as part of 
wholesale contracts relating to the delivery of gas or electricity. Likewise, public entities, when 
using interest rate derivatives to hedge their interest rate risk, include netting agreements in the 
contractual framework with a view to reducing the counterparty risk.  
A.  The importance of netting – market data 
The Bank for International Settlements provided data in a recent report
4 illustrating the effect of 
close-out netting: the notional amount of all types of OTC contracts stood at approximately USD 
605 trillion at the end of June 2009. The gross market value of these contracts, i.e. the cost of 
replacing  all  of  them  by  equivalent  contracts  at  the  market  price,  was  USD  25  trillion.  This 
amount corresponds to the market risk inherent in these contracts. At the same time, aggregate 
credit exposures of market participants, i.e. the remaining credit risk taking into account legally 
enforceable netting agreements, amounted to USD 3.7 trillion.  
B.  Netting and master agreements 
The  majority  of  financial  market  transactions  are  concluded  using  standard  documentation 
('master  agreements'),  for  example  derivatives,  foreign  exchange,  securities  lending  and 
repurchase contracts. A number of master agreements are available for the various types of 
financial contract and for various jurisdictions. 
For  cross-border  use,  the  International  Swaps  and  Derivatives  Association  (ISDA)  Master 
Agreement  is  the  quasi  standard  for  derivatives  transactions  from  the  global  perspective, 
whereas repurchase agreements are usually bundled under the International Capital Market 
Association  (ICMA)  Global  Master  Repurchase  Agreement;  in  Europe,  the  multi-product 
European  Master  Agreement  for  Financial  Transactions  (EMA)  of  the  European  Banking 
                                                                                                                                                         
(hereinafter: Basel Committee CBRG Report), Recommendation 8, p. 36 et seq. 
4 Bank for International Settlements, Monetary and Economic Department, OTC derivatives market activity in 
the first half of 2009, November 2009, http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy0911.pdf, p. 1.   7
Federation is widely applied. These agreements are accompanied by a set of optional annexes 
covering  different  types  of  financial  contract.  In  addition,  there  are  various  other  master 
agreements for specific sectors or jurisdictions, e.g. the New York Foreign Exchange Committee 
International Foreign Exchange Master Agreement (IFEMA); the International Foreign Exchange 
and Options Master Agreement (FEOMA); the International Securities Lending Association (ISLA) 
Global Master Securities Lending Agreement; the Convention-Cadre relative aux Opérations de 
Marché à Terme of the French Banking Association; the Contrat-Cadre de Prêts de Titres of the 
Association  of  French  Securities  Dealers;  the  Rahmenvertrag  für  Finanztermingeschäfte,  the 
Rahmenvertrag für Pensionsgeschäft, and the Rahmenvertrag für Wertpapierleihgeschäfte of the 
German Banking Associations; the Contrato Marco de Operaciones Financieras of the Association 
of Spanish Private Banks; the China Inter-bank Market Financial Derivatives Transactions Master 
Agreement of the National Association of Financial Markets Institutional Investors (NAFMII); the 
Standard Documentation for Derivatives Transactions on Financial Markets of the Association of 
Russian Banks (ARB); and the Brazilian Contrato Global de Derivados.  
Master agreements are not tied to any one particular applicable law, but English or New York 
law is usually chosen for cross-border agreements. Japanese, Hong Kong, Swiss, French, German, 
Spanish and Italian law have some regional importance. The European Master Agreement was 
geared from the outset to multi-jurisdictional (and multilingual) use and is concluded under one 
of the laws of the European Union Member States. 
Clauses on netting often form a core part of master agreements but, even though they are 
included in such standardised contracts, netting agreements nevertheless are still contracts that 
from a legal point of view could be negotiated separately and privately between the parties. 
Hence, the fact that netting agreements are often part of master agreements does not affect the 
results of this analysis in any way. This paper therefore uses the term ‘netting agreement’ on the 
understanding  that  netting  agreements  in  a  great  majority  of  cases  form  part  of  a  master 
agreement. 
C.  Set-off and the different types of netting agreements 
The notions of netting and its sub-categories settlement netting, novation netting and close-out 
netting  are  terms  developed  by  the  market.  There  is  some  common  understanding  as  to 
typology that is universally used. However, the market generally considers the issue of netting in 
functional terms (termination of contracts, computation of an aggregate amount, etc.), whereas 
from a legal perspective borderlines can be blurred. The background is that the functionalities of 
'netting' are often mirrored in legal terms by partial reference to existing concepts, notably set-
off, cf. infra, p. 19).
5 Apart from the distinction between the functional and legal perspectives, 
                                                 
5 Cf. European Financial Markets Lawyers Group (EFMLG), Protection for bilateral insolvency set-off and netting 
agreements under EC law, October 2004, paras. 15, 111 in relation to EU law applicable outside the banking 
sector:  the  use  of  the  term  'set-off'  in  the  EU  Insolvency  Regulation  and  its  subsequent  divergent 
implementation in the EU Member States has created deep uncertainty as to whether the Directive’s set-off 
protection (Article 6) encompasses elements that go beyond classical set-off, in particular close-out netting.    8 
the categorisation of netting is further complicated by the fact that the parties' agreement is 
capable of designing particular netting mechanisms or combining them with each other. Thus, 
the standard categories described below reflect only basic patterns, notably as shaped by the 
wide  application  of  master  agreements.  Against  this  background,  this  study  refrains  from 
referring to one or the other category, as there is no uniform understanding of the relevant 
terms. Rather, reference is made, with the exception of this section, to 'netting' in general, all 
the more since the difficulties encountered in accommodating netting in legal terms apply to a 
greater or lesser extent to all possible forms of netting arrangements. 
Set-off 
Classical set-off is different from what is generally understood by netting. Yet the term set-off is 
often used as an interface to describe the functions of netting and to transpose them into law 
(notably  the  function  of  computation  of  a  net amount).  Some  laws  even  treat  netting  as  a 
category of set-off. Set-off is the classical means of discharging mutual obligations, mostly (but 
not necessarily) payment obligations under which a debtor sets off a claim owed to it by its 
creditor against the debt, resulting in a single obligation equal to the difference between both 
claims. Set-off is generally allowed under statutory provisions and can be extended or altered by 
contract. It is allowed to the extent that both claims are due; some jurisdictions require that they 
stem from the same contractual relationship or are somehow 'connex'. 
Settlement netting 
The  instrument  of  settlement  netting  is  the  computation  by  contract  of  equivalent  fungible 
claims under executory contracts, e.g. for commodities or foreign exchange, where the mutual 
deliveries  fall  due  for  payment  or  delivery  on  the  same  day.  The  background  is  that  it  is 
sometimes  difficult  to  arrange  simultaneous  payments.  The  purpose  of  settlement  netting 
therefore is to reduce settlement risk (which forms part of the overall counterparty risk) as the 
only  remaining  obligation  for  the  parties  is  to  settle  the  net  balance.  Settlement  netting  is 
different from 'classical' set-off because it applies to deliveries under contracts that are still to be 
performed, whereas set-off traditionally applies to debts that are due.  
Example 2: Y-Bank sells X-Bank GBP 66 for USD 100. A few days later, Y-Bank sells X-Bank USD 
100 for GBP 67, to be paid on the same day as the first contract. If, on the day Y-Bank pays its 
GBP 66 and USD 100 under the two contracts, X-Bank becomes insolvent before paying its USD 
100 and GBP 67, Y-Bank has lost those gross amounts. But if the reciprocal amounts were netted 
when the second contract was entered into, Y-Bank’s exposures would be GBP 1. 
Settlement  netting  occurs  in  a  multilateral  context  (settlement  systems  for  payments  or 
securities  operated  by  stock  exchanges,  central  securities  depositories  or  central 
counterparties
6)  and  is  also  found  in  bilateral  relations  where  bundles  of  financial  contracts 
                                                 
6 In the 27 EU Member States, this issue is addressed in the Settlement Finality Directive which defines netting 
as the conversion into one net claim or one net obligation of claims and obligations resulting from transfer   9
between two parties are settled without the intervention of a market infrastructure, in particular 
in the case of derivatives contracts, securities lending or repo (cf. infra, p. 11), and settlement 
netting regularly figures in standard documentation, e.g. European Master Agreement, section 
3(4); ISDA Master Agreement, section 2(c). 
Netting by novation 
Netting by novation is a specialised form of settlement netting and employs a mechanism quite 
different from classical set-off. Two (or more) entire contracts (not just payment obligations) of 
the same type are terminated and replaced by a new contract of exactly the same type that 
mirrors only the net balance of the terminated contracts. 
Example 3:  A-Bank  buys  from  B-Bank  USD  100  for  EUR  75,  payable  on  1
st  September. 
Subsequently,  B-Bank  buys  from  A-Bank  USD  200  for  EUR  140.  The  parties  terminate  both 
contracts and replace them by an agreement under which B-Bank receives on 1
st September from 
A-Bank USD 100 against payment of USD 65.    
Netting by novation is basically confined to the foreign exchange market. It was used to reduce 
capital requirements under the Basel Capital Accord of 1988, whereas the 1994 version allowed 
for  the  less  cumbersome  close-out  netting.  Novation  netting  therefore  does  not  play  a 
prominent role in the financial market. 
Close-out netting 
The mechanism of close-out netting (or default netting) forms a core part of standard market 
documentation,  as  for  instance  the  ISDA  Master  Agreement  or  the  European  Master 
Agreement.
7 Close-out netting is the form of netting envisaged by Articles 31 and 33 of the 
Geneva Securities Convention (cf. infra, pp. 27 and 31) and underlies Recommendations 101-107 
of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law. 
Under such an agreement, the netting mechanism comes into operation either by a declaration 
(‘close-out’) of one party upon the occurrence of a pre-defined event, in particular default or 
insolvency of its counterparty (‘termination event’), or it is triggered automatically upon the 
occurrence  of  that  event  (‘automatic  termination’).  The  mechanism  extends  to  a  bundle  of 
existing and future financial contracts between the parties that are contractually included in the 
netting agreement. Upon close-out or automatic termination, all non-performed contracts are 
terminated  and  the  value  of  each  contract  is  determined  under  a  pre-defined  valuation 
mechanism. The aggregate value of all contracts is then computed so as to result in one single 
                                                                                                                                                         
orders which a participant or participants in a settlement system either issue to, or receive from, one or more 
other participants, with the result that only a net claim can be demanded or a net obligation be owed. 
7 European Master Agreement, sections 6 and 7; ISDA Master Agreement, sections 5 and 6.     10 
payment obligation (‘net amount’).
8 This obligation remains the only obligation to be settled and 
is generally due immediately after the net amount is determined.  
Where netting occurs in the context of the insolvency of one of the parties, and the net amount 
is positive for the solvent party, that party is paid from the insolvency estate as unsecured 
creditor and may therefore partly or fully lose its claim. Where the net amount is positive for the 
insolvent party, the solvent party must pay the insolvency estate. 
D.  Solvent and insolvency netting; termination event 
Netting can occur both in situations where both parties are solvent and in the event of the 
insolvency of either, since it is the parties to the netting agreement themselves that determine 
the trigger for the operation of the mechanism, the 'termination event'. This event may consist, 
in particular, in one of the parties defaulting on one or more of its obligations, or in its filing for 
insolvency, in the installation of a state administrator or a similar intervention by the public 
authorities, or in the opening of an insolvency proceeding or an administration, resolution or 
restructuring procedure. Netting agreements additionally include external circumstances as the 
termination event, such as the objective impossibility to perform an obligation under one of the 
financial contracts, or the downgrading in credit rating of one of the parties after its merger with 
another company. Given the range of potential termination events, it becomes evident that 
netting agreements can be designed to apply to both pre-insolvency and insolvency situations.  
Netting  agreements  are  in  general  covered  by  freedom  of  contract  –  however,  limits  are 
commonly  applied  to  this  principle  for  policy  reasons  and  become  manifest  in  rules  of 
mandatory law restricting party autonomy.  
Policy considerations will not as a rule preclude an agreement containing the requisite elements 
to terminate mutual contracts upon the fulfilment of a predefined condition, to value them and 
to compute their aggregate value, as does a netting agreement. As a consequence, it is fair to 
say  that  there  are  no  particular  obstacles  standing  in  the  way  of  the  effectiveness  and 
enforceability of netting agreements under general conditions, i.e. in respect of two solvent 
parties. However, there are certain limits, often deriving from general principles of law: for 
instance,  a  netting  agreement  might  be  considered  invalid  if  one  or  more  of  the  contracts 
                                                 
8 Cf. the central clauses of both aforementioned master agreements (capitalised terms are defined terms under 
the respective agreement):  
   ‘In the event of a termination pursuant to this Section […], neither party shall be obliged to make any 
further payment or delivery under the terminated Transaction(s) which would have become due on or 
after the Early Termination Date or to provide or return margin or collateral which would otherwise be 
required to be required to be provided or retuned under the Agreement and related to the terminated 
Transaction(s). These obligations shall be replaced by an obligation of either party to pay the Final 
Settlement Amount in accordance with Section […].’ (European Master Agreement, section 6(4)); 
   ‘Upon [close-out], no further payments or deliveries […] in respect of the Terminated Transactions will 
be required to be made […].The amount, if any, payable in respect of an Early Termination Date will be 
determined pursuant […].’ (ISDA Master Agreement, section 6(c)).   11
included  in the  agreement  are  themselves  invalid.  Moreover,  in  the context  of  the  ongoing 
discussions regarding the exceptionally negative effects of netting on systemic stability (cf. infra, 
p. 16 et seq.), consideration might be given to the possibility of restricting the choice of pre-
insolvency  termination  events  where  they  are  combined  with  an  automatic  termination 
mechanism. 
The situation is different in the event of insolvency of one of the parties, since the sole purpose 
of insolvency law is to put into practice policy decisions on the question of whose claims should 
be  prioritised  over  others'  claims.  Insolvency law  therefore  might  prevent  set-off,  allow  the 
administrator  to  'cherry  pick'  those  contracts  that  are  favourable  to  the  insolvent  estate, 
invalidate payments to the counterparty made during a 'suspect period' prior to the opening of 
the proceeding, etc. The conflict between these insolvency instruments, on the one hand, and 
the idea of applying netting to the entire bundle of the parties’ financial contracts, on the other 
hand, is obvious, and in practice effective netting agreements might be precluded by a variety of 
rules  of  insolvency  law.  However,  the  purpose  of  reducing  counterparty  and  systemic  risk 
becomes dominant especially in the event of insolvency of the counterparty. 
E.  Bilateral settlement and central clearing 
Financial  contracts  concluded  between  two  counterparties  may  be  settled  either  bilaterally, 
between the parties themselves, or through a central entity interposed between the parties. 
Netting is equally important in both scenarios. 
Bilateral settlement has so far been tacitly assumed in this analysis. It mirrors the classical two-
party situation where there are numerous mutual delivery and payment rights and obligations, 
some of which are due and others that are still to be performed in the future. In the course of 
regular business, payment obligations that are due may be subject to set-off and settlement 
netting. In the event of default, close-out netting may occur. 
This  study  uses  the  term  ‘central  clearing’  as  shorthand  for  the  functionalities  of  central 
counterparties, net payment systems and clearing and settlement systems in general, ensuring 
that the settlement and counterparty risk, though it exists from a contractual point of view 
between  the  parties,  is  concentrated  on  a  central  entity  and  is  permanently  kept  to  net 
exposure.  Central  clearing  applies  by  virtue  of  contractual  agreements  between  market 
participants or as a legal requirement. The arrangement achieves the aforementioned result by 
interposing the central entity between the parties to every financial contract, so that it becomes 
‘buyer to every seller and seller to every buyer’. The net risk exposure is calculated on a bilateral 
basis, so that each participant’s exposure exists exclusively against the central entity. This applies 
both to regular business scenarios, where settlement netting mechanisms apply, and to the 
default situation, where close-out netting arrangements may be operated. Thus, given that, from 
a  legal  point  of  view,  central  clearing  remains  strictly  bilateral,  considerations  in  respect  of 
bilateral settlement generally apply to central clearing.   12 
F.  Multi-branch netting 
Typically, financial market participants have several branches in jurisdictions other than that of 
their head office. A netting agreement may extend to the entirety of financial contracts entered 
into (with the same counterparty) by the head office and its foreign branches. Branches, as 
opposed to subsidiaries, are not legally independent from the head office, i.e. branches and the 
head office form part of the same legal entity. As long as a multi-branch entity is not insolvent, 
multi-branch netting would probably be recognised by the legal framework to the same extent 
as is netting generally. However, as soon as a multi-branch party becomes insolvent, everything 
will depend on whether there is a single insolvency proceeding covering both the head office 
and the branches (governed by the insolvency law of the head office) or whether there are 
separate proceedings over some or all the branches.
9 In the latter case, ring-fencing may occur, 
with the local insolvency administrator preventing claims and assets from being attributed to the 
head office estate or to the estate of another branch. 
G.  Multilateral netting 
The term ‘multilateral netting’ is not well-defined and is often used to describe central clearing, 
as set out above. However, truly multilateral netting refers to a very specific situation. The basic 
scenario, which is applied to some extent in some payment systems, consists of a number of 
independent financial market participants who compute their mutual exposure on a multilateral 
basis, employ functionalities similar to those used in close-out netting, capped by a system of 
mutual cross-assignments. 
Example 4: A-Bank, B-Bank and C-Bank conclude a multilateral netting agreement under which 
claims existing on a bilateral basis are replaced by net claims calculated on a multilateral basis. 
At a given point in time, A owes EUR 20 to B; B owes EUR 60 to C; and C owes EUR 40 to A. 
Following their agreement and after cross-assignment and computation, these claims are to be 
settled by A paying nothing, B paying EUR 40 to C, and C paying EUR 20 to A. 
It is worth mentioning that while, in this example, A-Bank’s exposure is the lowest, it would be 
possible, on the basis of the agreement, to make C-Bank the bank least exposed (in which case C-
Bank would have to pay nothing and have a claim of 20 € against B, whereas B would owe 40 € 
to A).  
This shows that multilateral netting can be used as a tool to circumscribe the exposure of one 
market participant vis-à-vis a multitude of other, independent market participants, typically a 
bank managing its risk exposure under one single netting agreement against several entities 
belonging to the same group of companies (therefore this form of netting is also called 'cross-
affiliate netting'). On the face of it, this situation resembles the multi-branch netting technique, 
with one important difference in that the affiliates are legally independent from each other.  
                                                 
9 Cf. UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, in particular Art. 20; EU Directive on reorganisation and 
winding up of credit institutions, in particular Art. 10.    13
The  legal  difficulties  of multilateral netting  are apparent: first,  the  contractual  agreement  is 
highly complex, using a system of mutual cross-assignments and cross-guarantees; secondly, the 
recognition of a multilateral netting agreement by the applicable insolvency law depends on 
whether netting in general and multilateral netting in particular are legally recognised; thirdly, to 
the extent that cross-assignments are only agreed on an ad hoc basis in the event of default of 
one of the parties, the insolvency administrator may subsequently avoid these agreements as 
unjustified preference; fourthly, in a cross-border situation, the applicable insolvency laws may 
exacerbate the aforementioned difficulties. It is these difficulties that are contributing to the 
growing use of central clearing facilities, as described above. 
II.  Benefits flowing from the use of netting 
As mentioned above, the primary purpose of netting agreements is to mitigate risk in the event 
of  default  of  the  counterparty,  by  making  sure  that  not  the  gross,  but  the  net  exposure 
represents the maximum risk in the event of the counterparty’s insolvency. Yet, the overall 
beneficial effect of netting, especially when widely used, extends not only to individual market 
participants but to the market as a whole, as the limitation of individual risk helps to forestall the 
systemic implications of failure of a systemically relevant institution. 
A.  The individual perspective: a competitive advantage 
Where both parties are subject to jurisdictions that accommodate netting arrangements in a 
consistent  manner,  they  can  enter  into  financial  contracts  with  each  other  and  so  take 
advantage of a range of beneficial effects flowing from the possibility of concluding a netting 
agreement  on  a  clear  legal  basis.  These  beneficial  effects  mainly  consist  in  a  reduction  of 
counterparty risk on the one hand, and a more favourable position in terms of the underlying 
capitalisation on the other hand. If one party is subject to a law that is unclear, indifferent or 
even unfavourable to netting arrangements, the conclusion of a netting agreement, if at all 
possible, does not carry similar benefits. As a consequence, parties in the former group contract 
with each other much more easily than with parties from jurisdictions belonging to the latter 
group. Thus, financial market participants subject to jurisdictions that offer a consistent legal 
framework for netting benefit from competitive advantages on an individual level. 
Reduction of counterparty risk 
Netting reduces counterparty risk in two ways. To begin with, settlement netting is used to 
mitigate settlement risk, i.e. to minimise the potential loss resulting from the non-fulfilment by 
one party of its payment or delivery obligations (cf. supra, p. 8).  
Close-out netting moreover counteracts credit risk. The analysis of this functionality takes as its 
starting point the fact that each contract, whether financial or other, is favourable to one of the 
parties, i.e. the contract, for that party, results in a positive value (the party is 'in the money'). In 
the event of insolvency of the other party, this positive amount would probably be lost unless 
collateralised. By contrast, where a party is 'out of the money', the counterparty’s insolvency   14 
does not change anything, since it will have to fulfil its obligations vis-à-vis the insolvency estate. 
Close-out  netting  agreements  address  the  common  situation  where  there  are  numerous 
financial contracts between two parties, some favourable to one party, the others favourable to 
the other party. Without close-out netting, the solvent party would lose out on all contracts that 
were favourable to it, but where it had to fulfil those contracts favourable to the insolvency 
estate. 
Capital adequacy and cost of capital 
Banking  supervision  has  generally  recognised  the  risk-reducing  effect  of  close-out  netting. 
Therefore, banks may calculate capital requirements on the basis of net, rather than gross, credit 
exposures.  However,  the  theoretical  option  to  use  netting  in  the  event  of  default  of  the 
counterparty must be backed by the certainty that a bank can effectively limit its exposure to the 
net amounts. In order to guarantee that capital requirements adequately reflect the exposure of 
loans and deposits, the Basel II Accord
10 requires banks to  
   have a well-founded legal basis for concluding that the netting agreement is enforceable 
in  each  relevant  jurisdiction  regardless  of  whether  the  counterparty  is  insolvent  or 
solvent;  
   be able at any time to determine those assets and liabilities with the same counterparty 
that are subject to the netting agreement; 
   monitor  and  control  the  risk  of  sudden  increases  in  exposure  when  short-dated 
obligations, which have been netted against longer-dated claims, mature ('roll-off risks'); 
and to  
   monitor and control the relevant exposures on a net basis.  
Only if these conditions are met may they use the net exposure of loans and deposits as the 
basis for their capital adequacy calculation in accordance with the relevant formulae. Lower 
capital  requirements  immediately  result  in  reduced  cost  of  capital  and  increased  liquidity. 
Moreover, netting reduces the cost of single financial contracts because less collateral needs to 
be provided if mutual positions can be netted. 
B.  The market perspective: increased systemic stability and liquidity 
Also from the wider perspective of the financial system, the benefits of enforceability of close-
out  netting  agreements  are  not  confined  to  crisis  situations  but  likewise  materialise  under 
normal market conditions. 
                                                 
10 Bank for International Settlements/Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Comprehensive version), June 2006, http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
bcbs128.htm (‘Basel II Accord’), paras 117, 118, 139, 188; Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector, 
(Consultative Document), December 2009, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf?noframes=1, p. 43.   15
Systemic stability 
Systemic risk occurs where market participants are exposed to each other’s failure in such a way 
that a chain reaction of insolvencies may ultimately ensue. The use of close-out netting can 
prevent this risk of contagion from becoming systemic, i.e. affecting the financial market in such 
a way that it becomes dysfunctional. This beneficial effect is grounded in the idea that close-out 
netting  shields  systemically  important  market  participants  from  the  consequences  of  their 
counterparty’s insolvency.  
This is why the Cross-border Bank Resolution Group (CBRG) of the Basel Committee, in its recent 
report, mentions enforceable netting agreements in a list of mechanisms capable of mitigating 
systemic  risk  in  the  first  place,  along  with  collateralisation,  segregation  of  client  assets  and 
standardisation  and  regulation  of  derivatives  over-the-counter  transactions.  Consequently,  it 
calls  upon  national  authorities  to  promote  the convergence  of  national  rules  governing  the 
enforceability of netting agreements with respect to their scope of application and legal effects 
across borders.
11  
Market liquidity 
Where netting is beneficial on an individual basis, the relevant advantages become manifest also 
on a global scale. Notably, as capital requirements for financial institutions decrease as soon as 
an institution applies a consistent netting policy, more capital is available for lending. Secondly, 
and by the same token, as collateral provided between counterparties is calculated on the basis 
of  net  exposure,  fewer  assets  (cash,  securities)  are  blocked  in  collateral  arrangements. 
Furthermore,  settlement  netting  arrangements  decrease  transaction  costs  and  consequently 
render the market more efficient.  
As a result, it may be assumed that the wide use of netting agreements in the financial market 
frees funds, which in turn increases overall market liquidity. 
III.  The drawbacks inherent in netting 
A.  Shifting general policies in respect of insolvency regimes? 
By  introducing  a  robust  netting  regime,  some  jurisdictions  have  clarified  that  netting 
arrangements  should  be  shielded  against  certain  instruments  relating  to  the  insolvency 
procedure. However, this development seems to grant more favourable treatment to some of 
the insolvent’s creditors. Systemically relevant market participants generally conclude netting 
agreements with each other to cover their mutual financial contracts. Where netting agreements 
are enforceable in the event of insolvency, their operation leads to moving the counterparty risk 
(the risk must logically be borne by someone) to those of the insolvent’s creditors that are not 
covered by a netting agreement and whose claims are not collateralised. These entities are 
                                                 
11 Basel Committee CBRG Report, Recommendation 8, p. 36 et seq.   16 
generally non-financial institutions and consequently not systemically relevant for the financial 
market. 
A frequent general policy approach of insolvency law consists in securing as many assets as 
possible for the insolvency estate (and hence for the subsequent pro rata distribution amongst 
unsecured creditors) by attributing a certain ‘priority’ to the insolvency estate. This ‘priority’ 
materialises in rules prohibiting insolvency set-off (there are two scenarios here, either a stay on 
pre-insolvency claims or a ban on set-off claims acquired after the insolvency filing against claims 
acquired  prior  to  the  insolvency  filing),  or  allowing  for  ‘cherry  picking’  by  the  insolvency 
administrator. To the extent that close-out netting is enforceable, claims and assets are not 
drawn  into  the  insolvency  estate  (being  blocked  until  distributed)  but  remain  immediately 
available as liquid assets in the market.  
Against this, it is fair to say that guaranteeing the enforceability of insolvency netting constitutes 
a paradigm shift in certain jurisdictions. However, both approaches (keep liquidity in the market 
or draw liquidity into the estate) show benefits and drawbacks – and it ultimately appears to be 
a policy choice whether to apply one or the other approach in relation to certain groups of 
counterparties, in the present context, systemically relevant ones.   
B.  Pre-emption of regulatory intervention 
Since the 2007/2009 financial crisis it has become clear that automatic enforceability of netting 
agreements  not  only  brings  advantages  but  may  carry  significant  disadvantages  in  times  of 
pressure on the financial market. The Basel Cross-border Bank Resolution Group (CBRG) insists 
that these dangers, if not addressed appropriately, are anything but negligible.
12 
The CBRG’s critical review of the role of netting agreements considers, first, the automatism of 
termination and close-out of non-performed contracts upon the occurrence of the enforcement 
event. The enforcement event is generally defined in the netting agreement and may be any 
event, not only insolvency of the counterparty but also simple default, the appointment of an 
administrator,  the  intervention  of  state  authorities,  or  any  other  pre-insolvency  event.  Its 
occurrence may trigger the simultaneous closing-out of large volumes of financial contracts. If a 
major market player is in distress, such a situation may undermine orderly resolution. 
In certain cases, it would be preferable to transfer the debtor’s financial contracts to a solvent 
third party, a bridge bank or similar entity and to wind the insolvent entity down in an orderly 
fashion while saving the viable contracts and avoiding sending shock waves to the market. How 
precarious such a situation may be is illustrated by the scenario where a regulator hesitates to 
step in, knowing that its intervention is capable of triggering a chain reaction of automatic close-
out netting. The CBRG paper therefore recommends introducing powers for national regulators 
                                                 
12 Basel Committee CBRG Report, pp. 39-41 (Recommendation 9).   17
   to delay automatic close-out and termination for up to 48 hours in order to allow a 
decision on whether the distressed party’s financial contracts should be transferred to 
a solvent institution, and,  
   to effect such a transfer of contracts, under certain conditions.  
For  example,
13  in  the  United  States,  the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  (FDIC),  as 
receiver  or  conservator  of  a  distressed  bank  participating  in  the  insurance  scheme,  has  the 
power to enforce or repudiate certain qualified financial contracts within a reasonable period of 
time. It also has the power to transfer to a healthy financial institution the qualified financial 
contracts (including related collateral and suchlike) between the bank and its counterparties. 
The FDIC as receiver has until 5 p.m. on the business day after its appointment as receiver to 
notify  counterparties  of  the  transfer  of  such  contracts.  Counterparties  are  not  entitled  to 
terminate  or  close  out  and  net  such  contracts  until  5  p.m.  on  the  following  business  day. 
Thereafter,  full  close-out  and  netting  rights  are  available  in  respect  of  qualified  financial 
contracts remaining in the receivership, but not in respect of contracts transferred to a healthy 
financial institution or bridge bank. In the case of either repudiation or transfer, the FDIC must 
repudiate or transfer all or none of the qualified financial contracts between the ailing bank and 
a counterparty and that counterparty’s affiliate. 
The possibility of close-out netting actually exacerbating the risk to systemic stability represents 
a  serious  drawback  of  automatic  close-out  mechanisms  featuring  as  an  element  of  netting 
agreements. Some jurisdictions have addressed the question of regulatory prevalence over this 
automatism but the conflict between the need for enforceable netting agreements as a risk 
mitigation technique, on the one hand, and the pre-emption of sensible regulatory action by the 
automatism of close–out, on the other hand, is far from resolved. Future action would need to 
be directed towards a conciliation of these to flipsides (cf. infra, pp. 21 et seq.). 
2
nd Part – The need for an international instrument on netting 
Roughly speaking, 40 jurisdictions have adopted netting legislation
14 with a view to creating a 
consistent and reliable legal framework allowing for netting. The common purpose of these laws 
is to render netting enforceable; however, rules are heterogeneous as regards their personal and 
material scope. Other jurisdictions have not yet implemented netting legislation. As a result, the 
global view gives an inconsistent picture, and the enforceability of netting agreements that are 
either outside the scope or subject to a jurisdiction that does not recognise netting at all faces 
various hurdles (cf. infra, I.).  
                                                 
13 Cited after Basel Committee CBRG Report, footnote 25.  
14 ISDA regularly updates a list of countries that have adopted netting legislation on its website 
www.isda.org/docproj/stat_of_net_leg.htm.    18 
Additionally,  the  implementation  of  special  regulatory  powers  to  impose  a  moratorium  on 
netting arrangements, as has recently been contemplated, might require adjustments of the 
legal framework with a view to avoiding cross-jurisdictional conflicts in the area of private law, in 
particular in respect of proprietary aspects (cf. infra, II.).  
The following sections further analyse these issues, so as to enable an assessment to be made on 
the need, character and depth of harmonisation of netting rules (cf. infra, III.). 
I.  The status quo on enforceability of netting 
A.  Personal and material scope 
Most 'netting-friendly' jurisdictions limit enforceability to certain types of eligible party. Banks 
are,  as  a  rule,  covered.  Other  categories  of  participant  are  covered  in  many,  some  or  few 
jurisdictions,  such  as,  for  example,  insurance  companies,  investment  firms,  partnerships, 
investment  funds,  hedge  funds,  proprietary  traders,  pension  funds,  central  banks,  public 
authorities, etc. Natural persons, by contrast, are generally excluded. From a legislative point of 
view,  this  might  be  a  consequence of  the  context  in  which  the  netting  rules  are  placed,  in 
particular where netting rules form part of a wider instrument of financial market legislation 
such  as,  for  example,  a  banking  code  or  similar  instrument.  Yet  it  is  clear  that  legislators 
intentionally  restrict  netting  rules  to  certain  counterparties,  often  reflecting  the  underlying 
policy that systemic stability of the financial system must be shielded against failure of a major 
market participant, which means that systemically important institutions should be covered by 
netting legislation. 
Where jurisdictions provide for netting legislation, the material scope differs in relation to two 
questions:  
   first, as regards the definition (if any) of netting, ultimately determining the extent to 
which netting is recognised; and, 
   secondly, which types of financial contract may be included in a netting agreement.  
B.  Issues relating to general principles of law 
At present, in many jurisdictions, netting as a legal concept is not recognised, or at least not fully 
or clearly recognised. Because of its ready association with existing legal concepts, in particular 
set-off and the attempt to accommodate netting without legislative change, the enforceability of 
netting  agreements  in  accordance  with  their  terms  may  be  uncertain.  Most  of  the  typical 
obstacles to the proper operation of the netting mechanism are shown below. However, such a 
list can never be exhaustive and there are probably other obstacles to the enforceability of an 
agreement, stipulating that one single net amount is owed by one party to the other, computed 
on the basis of all open obligations and the value of all non-performed contracts.   19
Association with set-off rules 
While it is true that netting has its own functional mechanisms and a wider scope of application 
than set-off, there are a number of similarities. This impression is strengthened by the fact that 
the  concept  of  netting  is  new  to  most  legal  systems;  hence,  there  is  a  danger  of  its  being 
translated  without  any  further  ado  into  national  legislation  by  drawing  on  the  established 
concept and wording of set-off (cf. supra, p. 7 et seq.). However, set-off alone cannot mirror all 
the  functionalities  of  netting,  and  conceptual  limitations  to  set-off  that  are,  for  lack  of  any 
clarifying  legal  rule,  applied  to  netting  agreements  by  judges  and  insolvency  administrators 
would commonly affect any of the three functional elements of the netting mechanism: 
   set-off  applies  only  to  obligations  that  are  due,  not  to  unperformed  contracts: 
applying this rule to netting would preclude the termination of the financial contracts 
included in the netting agreement; 
   set-off applies only to obligations flowing from the same agreement, or to 'connex' 
obligations: applying this principle to netting would mean that a netting agreement 
cannot  cover  all  financial  contracts  between  the  parties  but  only  those  that  are 
connected; 
   set-off  applies  only  to  payment  obligations  or  congenerous  obligations:  the 
application of this principle to netting would preclude the element of valuation of the 
financial contracts included in the agreement and their transformation into a single 
payment obligation.  
Non-eligible contracts included in the netting agreement; gambling 
Even in 'netting-friendly' jurisdictions, netting agreements are enforceable only to the extent 
that they relate to certain types of eligible financial contract. The range of eligible financial 
contracts differs between jurisdictions, either as a consequence of a clear policy decision, or 
because  the  relevant  wording  of  the  scope  is  not  updated  to  reflect  recent  market 
developments. 
Where non-eligible contracts have been included in the netting agreement, there is uncertainty 
as to the consequences: since the netting agreement and all the financial contracts it includes 
are often regarded as one contract, general principles of law could block the enforceability of the 
bundle as a whole instead of excluding from the netting mechanism, in an isolated manner, such 
un-eligible contracts once they had been identified.  
A subcategory of the foregoing relates to financial contracts that might not be enforceable per se 
in  certain  jurisdictions.  This  relates  mainly  to  certain  derivative  contracts  that  risk  being 
considered as gaming or gambling contracts. Where the applicable law characterises a type of 
derivative  contract  as  non-enforceable  gaming  contract,  the  enforceability  of  the  netting 
agreement with respect to the remaining financial contracts should not be affected.    20 
C.  Issues relating to enforceability under insolvency law 
Netting agreements, as elements of master agreements, are usually concluded under the law of 
New York or England, and regionally also under the law of Hong Kong, Japan, Germany, Spain, 
Italy or France. However, the law applicable to the rights and obligations under the contract is 
not necessarily identical to the law governing any insolvency proceeding over one of the parties, 
and  determined  either  following  the  universality  or  the  territoriality  principle.  Against  this 
background, in either case, it is often questionable whether a netting agreement concluded 
under Law A (the contract law) is enforceable in an insolvency proceeding under Law B (the 
insolvency  law),  in  particular  where  the  law  of  the  insolvency  proceeding  does  not  have 
dedicated netting provisions. 
‘Cherry picking’ and prohibition of early termination 
In an insolvency proceeding, the insolvency administrator often has the right to 'cherry pick' 
from the insolvent party's non-performed contracts. This means that he is entitled to insist vis-à-
vis any counterparty on performance of those contracts that are favourable to the insolvency 
estate. In many jurisdictions, the right to ‘cherry-pick’ supersedes the possibility of terminating 
open contracts and computing their values so as to form a single net obligation. Where cherry 
picking applies to the financial contracts covered by a netting agreement, the bundle of financial 
contracts intended to be covered by the netting mechanism would be disassembled and the 
solvent party would have to perform all contracts that are unfavourable from its perspective, 
whereas the favourable contract would not be performed by the insolvency administrator – 
ultimately,  it  would  be  exposed  to  the  full  counterparty  risk.  Those  jurisdictions  that 
accommodate netting tend to solve the conflict between cherry-picking and enforceability of 
netting agreements by disallowing the selection of isolated contracts but giving the insolvency 
administrator the right to decide whether the net amount is to be paid or not. 
Preferences and suspect periods 
National insolvency laws often contain rules allowing the insolvency administrator or a court to 
avoid transfers or payments that occurred prior to the opening of the insolvency proceeding, 
notably as unjustified preference of one or more creditors over the remaining creditors. In some 
jurisdictions,  only  transfers  and  payments  that  were  made  within  a  legally  defined  'suspect 
period' can be voided, in other jurisdictions, no such time limit exists. In the context of netting, 
the danger consists in the netting being equated with performance of the obligations flowing 
from  the  financial  contract.  As  netting  agreements  often  define  a  termination  event  which 
occurs  chronologically  before  but  close  to  the  opening  of  the  insolvency  proceeding  (for 
example, the default of one of the parties), there is an increased likeliness of the operation of 
the netting mechanism falling into the scope of the aforementioned rules. Even in cases where 
the insolvency administrator's attempt to void the transfer or payment can subsequently be 
scrapped by a court, the netting agreement does not achieve its purpose of decreasing exposure 
to  counterparties  risk  and  avoiding  contagion  by  the  insolvency  of  one  party  of  other 
participants in the financial market.   21
II.  Private law implications of the regulatory moratorium 
As described above, financial market regulators call for special powers over financial contracts 
covered by netting agreements where the automatic operation of netting would aggravate the 
situation of a distressed financial institution and further endanger systemic stability (cf. supra, 
page 16): 
   first, there should be the power to delay the operation of netting agreements in order 
to avoid the immediate close-out of an enormous number of financial contracts that 
would destroy any effort to save a distressed financial institution; 
   secondly,  there  should  be  the  power  to  transfer  the  financial  contracts  from  the 
distressed  party  to  a  healthy  financial  institution,  after  which  a  close-out  of  the 
transferred contracts should be impossible. 
Several  unresolved  questions  arise  in  this  context.  Only  some  of  these  are  connected  to 
private/insolvency law issues, and it is these that will therefore be discussed in this paper. The 
first, most obvious, question is whether and how the aim of promoting enforceability of netting 
agreements may be reconciled with the need to avoid precisely that automatism in respect of 
certain market participants in systemically relevant situations by imposing a regulatory stay on 
netting. The second question
15 concerns the recognition of a transfer of assets (on the basis of 
regulatory powers) by foreign jurisdictions, courts and insolvency administrators. 
Cross-border consistency of regulatory safeguards 
As regards the first question, the problem from the perspective of private and insolvency law is 
not so much the introduction of the power of moratorium itself; similar powers are common to 
the insolvency procedure and regulatory environment anyway. Rather, the difficulty is that of 
introducing the possibility of such a moratorium while avoiding the risk of undermining the 
beneficial effects of netting in concrete cases and (probably even more importantly) its reliability 
in general.
16  
The reconciliation of these two aspects, which are ultimately both risk mitigation tools, would 
require maintaining the usefulness of netting agreements to the greatest possible extent despite 
                                                 
15 Cf. Basel Committee CBRG Report, para 115 and footnote 25. The report raises additional questions, notably 
(a) whether and how the described regulatory powers could apply to affiliates of banks which are themselves 
not subject to banking regulation and which engage in financial contracts (in particular derivatives). Under the 
current laws in place, it is highly questionable whether regulators are able to transfer contracts concluded by 
such an entity to a healthy entity; (b) whether insolvent counterparties or their estate should have the option 
to realise the benefit of 'in the money' derivatives contracts after netting. Cf. also Commission Staff Working 
Document accompanying Communication by the European Commission, An EU Framework for Cross-Border 
Crisis Management in the Banking Sector, 20.10.2009, document number COM(2009) 561 final, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0561:FIN:EN:PDF, page 38 para. 113. 
16 This double aim is pursued by regulators themselves, as flows from the combination of Recommendations 8 
and 9 of the CGRG Report. Cf. HM Treasury, Special Resolution Regime, safeguards for partial property transfer, 
November 2008, pp. 11-14 for a discussion of solutions under UK law.   22 
the existence of regulatory powers to preclude netting for short periods of time. Factors such as 
the following might contribute to giving that assurance
17: 
   the  power  of  the  regulator  to  halt  the  enforcement  of  the  netting  agreement  is 
restricted  to  a  relatively  short  timeframe  (regulators  discuss  a  timeframe  of  24-48 
hours); 
   the financial contracts included in a netting agreement can only be transferred as a 
package, i.e. the netting agreement and all the contracts it covers must be transferred 
together, if at all; 
   the  termination  event  that  occurred  in  the  sphere  of  the  former  (now  insolvent) 
counterparty does not produce its effect as against the new (solvent) counterparty; 
however,  if  subsequently  a  termination  event  occurs  in  respect  of  the  new 
counterparty, the original terms of the netting agreement apply; 
   where a package consisting of a netting agreement and the relevant financial contracts 
is not transferred and remains in the original counterparty's estate, the operation of the 
netting  mechanism  is  preserved  and  allowed  as  from  the  end  of  the  moratorium; 
however, there must be clarity about the process of valuation under a close-out netting 
agreement, because the value of an asset might change during the moratorium. 
The cross-border consistency of the legal netting framework would suffer considerably if the 
above or similar elements were to be implemented in an uncoordinated manner, and the legal 
certainty regarding the enforceability of netting might even decrease as compared to the status 
quo.  
Rights governed by foreign law 
The  second  question  is  closely  connected  to  the  first  and  takes  as  its  starting  point  the 
understanding that a netting agreement and the financial contracts it covers form a bundle that 
should as a rule not be dissociated. Where a regulatory authority intends to transfer such a 
bundle to a bridge institution, it is highly likely that some of the contracts in the bundle are 
governed by a foreign law
18. Hence either the consequences of such a transfer by virtue of 
regulatory powers to a new party would need to be recognised under the relevant foreign law 
and by a foreign court, or the foreign contracts cannot be (validly) transferred and remain in the 
estate of the ailing bank, which would lead to dissociation.  
The  issue  is  even  more  apparent  where  the  bundle  of  financial  contracts  contains  property 
interests over movables, immovables or securities, in particular under a pledge or other security 
interest: the law governing a security interest derives from the location or place of the securities 
                                                 
17 Cf. Basel Committee CBRG Report, pp. 40 et seq. 
18 Cf. HM Treasury, Special Resolution Regime, safeguards for partial property transfer, November 2008, p. 12 
para. 2.11, analysing the concept of transfer to a bridge institution in relation to contracts which are not 
governed by a foreign law.   23
account respectively – and it is far from granted that this law would recognise a transfer of 
proprietary rights to a bridge institution by virtue of special powers of a foreign financial market 
authority. As a consequence, under the law governing the proprietary aspects, property rights 
might be left behind in the embattled entity, again entailing the disassembling of the package of 
financial contracts covered by the original netting agreement.   
III.  Assessment: the need for an international instrument 
The assessment starts with a distinction: the need for an international instrument in the area of 
financial market law can arise from  
(i) the perception that the functioning and stability of the financial market as a whole, 
including both the business side and the task of law and supervision, are enhanced by a 
harmonised legal framework, and/or,  
(ii) the conviction that an uncoordinated legal framework poses a measurable threat to 
legal certainty.  
By contrast, just making the life of financial market players easier is a weak case for international 
harmonisation. 
The  analysis  of  the  preceding  sections  covers  two  spheres,  i.e.,  the  desire  to  enhance  and 
promote enforceability of netting agreements on the one hand, and the proper reflection in 
private law of special regulatory resolution powers on the other.  
Considering the aim of enhancing enforceability of netting agreements 
The  aim  of  enhanced  and  globally  accepted  enforceability  of  netting  agreements  probably 
resides in the first of the categories described above, i.e. it is about enhancing the functioning of 
the capital market as a whole. The analysis in the introductory part of this paper demonstrated, 
on  the  one hand,  that enhanced enforceability produces  benefits  in  terms  of  a  competitive 
advantage  to  those  market  participants  and  markets  that  can  rely  on  their  insolvency  law 
recognising netting, since they pose a lower counterparty risk to their partners and allow for 
more favourable assessment of capital requirements. Promoting and globalising enforceability 
would gradually extend this benefit to other participants in other markets and regions until the 
competitive advantage of individual markets disappeared because netting would be accepted 
virtually everywhere.  
On the other hand, the analysis showed that enforceable netting agreements have beneficial 
effects  on  the  entire  financial  market,  as  they  reduce  systemic  risk.  This  is  why  regulatory 
authorities and the relevant international for a, such as the Bank for International Settlements, 
support netting agreements as a risk mitigation tool, and there is agreement that the more 
jurisdictions recognise netting, the better the protection of the global systemic stability of the 
financial market.  
These  benefits  come  at  the  price  of  the  paradigm  shift  referred  to  earlier:  liquidity  is  not 
concentrated in the insolvency estate but remains available in the market, which is ultimately a   24 
policy choice and which cannot be regarded as a substantive drawback of netting (cf. supra, 
p. 15).  
Against this background, it would appear fair to say that an international instrument would be 
justified by the considerable benefit for the market as a whole and the absence of significant 
disadvantages.  
By contrast, it would appear that there is no need for harmonisation to overcome specific cross-
border legal uncertainty surrounding the issue of enforceability. Rather, any legal difficulties 
appear to be confined to internal inconsistencies between the general legal framework and the 
relatively new concept of netting. In this context, it is important that an international instrument 
give comprehensive and neutral guidance to those markets contemplating the introduction of 
netting legislation. 
Considering the aim of accommodating regulatory powers in foreign private law 
The  attempt  to  accommodate,  within  the  legal  framework,  the  newly-developed  resolution 
powers of regulatory authorities – temporary moratoria and transfer of the bundle of financial 
contracts to a bridge institution – pursues a different aim. Here, the analysis reveals that the 
absence of common legal standards results in legal incompatibilities with the potential to create 
considerable uncertainty regarding the enforceability of netting and the effectiveness of security 
interests. As opposed to the aspect dealt with in the preceding section, this situation is the clear 
outcome of cross-border legal inconsistencies (cf. supra, p. 21 et seq.).  
Given  the  concrete  context  described  above,  touching  among  other  things  upon  questions 
regarding  proprietary  rights  and  private  international  law,  it  also  appears  unlikely  that  the 
relevant  differences  between  jurisdictions  would  disappear  spontaneously  without  the 
intervention  of  a  commonly  agreed  international  benchmark.  Moreover,  an  international 
instrument would, in addition (ideally) to removing legal inconsistencies, contribute to easing 
cross-border insolvency situations by improving the coordination between the home and host 
country authorities in respect of the legal framework in the area of netting. 
Result 
Both  aims  would  appear  likely  to  benefit  from  or  even  require  the  development  of  an 
international instrument. The case for the second aspect is probably even stronger than the first 
from the standpoint of cross-border legal certainty, whereas the first aspect is of high practical 
day-to-day  relevance.  Yet  both  are  ultimately  linked  to  the  same  basic  question,  i.e.  the 
enforceability and legal effects of netting agreements in the light of most important areas of the 
law. This parallelism suggests that both strands, although described separately above, are in 
practice  to  a  great  extent  naturally  connected  and  cannot  be  dealt  with  separately.  This 
understanding,  given  that  the  second  strand  addresses  concrete  cross-border  legal 
inconsistencies, results in a strong case for developing an international instrument on the entire 
matter.   25
3
rd Part – Guidelines for an international instrument 
I.  Approach 
An international instrument regarding the enforceability of netting and cross-border private law 
effects of supervisory moratoria could be developed, in a first step, in the form of a non-binding 
instrument, i.e. Principles or a Model Law. In a second step, isolated issues relevant to both 
aspects might be addressed in a binding instrument, i.e. an international Convention. 
Developing  an  international  instrument  on  the  legal  framework  for  netting  would  probably 
require a mixed approach, with the final result being achieved in two steps. 
The notion of a mixed approach is used here to refer to the question of whether a binding 
(international  Convention)  or  non-binding  (model  law,  principles)  instrument  should  be 
envisaged. The preliminary impression suggests that work envisaging both types of instrument 
would  be  able  to  unlock  the  distinct  advantages  of  both  the  binding  and  the  non-binding 
approach,  in  respect  of  different  areas  of  the  subject-matter.  At  the  same  time,  certain 
drawbacks could be avoided, in particular that of encroaching upon fundamental policy decisions 
taken by the various jurisdictions. 
As  regards  the  general  aspects  surrounding  the  enhancement  of  enforceability  of  netting 
agreements, it is important to recall that there is very little or even no specific cross-border legal 
uncertainty  that  would  pose  a  particular  risk.  What  is  most  important  for  the  reduction  of 
systemic risk is to achieve agreement on the core rule of enforceability. Many related elements 
are questions, rather, of building a common functional understanding on how to shape certain 
elements in order effectively to reinforce netting as a risk mitigation tool. 
The analysis is different when it comes to the appropriate recognition in private law terms of 
special regulatory resolution powers: here, cross-border incompatibilities with respect to private 
law are quantifiable, in particular as regards proprietary aspects (collateral deposited abroad), 
and a binding instrument would be the most efficient solution to remove such inconsistencies. 
However,  the  questions  that  arise  in  this  area  concern  certain  policy  areas  where  binding 
agreements may be difficult to achieve. Therefore, also in this context, it might be best for a very 
few core issues to be addressed in a binding instrument, leaving other, related issues to be dealt 
with in a nonbinding form. 
Making a distinction between issues that may be usefully addressed in a Convention and issues 
better suited to regulation in the form of principles or a model law in itself already requires a 
certain degree of common understanding in order to reach agreement. Moreover, those private 
law issues involved in any new regulatory powers need to be explored further, in parallel with, 
and to some extent following, the evolution of the regulatory approach itself. Consequently, 
under a two-step approach, work could start on a non-binding instrument setting out all the 
material aspects, with a subsequent second phase adding a binding instrument on some crucial, 
isolated aspects.     26 
II.  Personal scope 
An international instrument could extend to a wide range of participants in the financial market. 
On grounds of important policy considerations, the possibility of opt-outs should be considered. 
Most  jurisdictions  limit  the  enforceability  of  netting  agreements  to  certain  eligible  types  of 
parties in one way or the other; banks are generally included. Other categories are covered in 
many, some or few jurisdictions, such as, for example, insurance companies, investment firms, 
partnerships, investment funds, hedge funds, proprietary traders, pension funds, central banks, 
public authorities, etc. Natural persons, by contrast, are usually excluded. 
An international instrument cannot reflect similar considerations in its personal scope. First, 
there  are  too  many  reasons  to  restrict  the  scope,  and  policy  considerations  valid  in  one 
jurisdiction might not make much sense in others. Secondly, restrictions of the personal scope in 
the  majority  of  cases  requires  categorisation  of  eligible  and  non-eligible  parties  ('banks', 
'investment firms', 'charitable organisations', 'retail investor', 'clearing systems'). However, there 
is no international nomenclature in place that would allow a ready definition of relevant parties 
and it is unlikely that an instrument on netting would be able to include a generally accepted set 
of definitions of all relevant market participants. Inconsistent handling of the personal scope of 
an international instrument would cut away much of the legal certainty it seeks to achieve. 
Thirdly, as set out above, one of the main drivers for harmonisation of netting legislation is its 
preventive effect in terms of the systemic implications of market participants' insolvency. While 
it is true that the systemic argument is most obvious with respect to financial institutions, it is 
not conceptually confined to this category of market participant. Other types of parties that are 
associated to a greater (e.g. insurance companies) or lesser (e.g. carmakers) extent with financial 
institutions can spark similar effects through the global financial architecture if they fall insolvent 
and netting is not available. 
An international instrument, by contrast, should, as a first step, settle on the principle of being 
applicable to all types of party. Where jurisdictions feel a strong need to shield certain parties 
from this area of the financial market, a first consideration should be whether the policy is 
regulatory  in  nature  (e.g.,  certain  instruments  should  be  restricted  to  certain  market 
participants)  or  whether  it  is  actually  founded  in  the  environment  of  legal  enforceability  of 
netting  as  a  risk  mitigation  mechanism.  Where  the  policy  actually  has  its  roots  in  the  risk 
mitigation environment, mechanisms would need to be developed to allow opt-outs in order to 
ensure that these jurisdictions can participate in a binding instrument. Yet such exemptions from 
the  scope  of  the  instrument  will  make  its  application  more  difficult  and  undo  some  of  its 
beneficial effects in terms of certainty and systemic stability. 
III.  Material scope 
In an international instrument, regard must be given to the characteristics of, first, the meaning 
of  netting,  secondly,  which  types  of  agreement  are  aimed  at,  and,  thirdly,  which  types  of 
contracts can be covered by it.   27
A.  Netting  
An international instrument will have to define the term ‘netting’. A functional definition would 
take as its starting point the basic elements of termination, valuation, and computation of an 
aggregate  net  amount.  Article  33(3)(j)  of  the  Geneva  Securities  Convention  offers  a  first 
blueprint for a definition.  
An  international  instrument  addressing  enforceability  of  netting  would  have  to  find  a  clear 
definition, also to avoid netting being interpreted differently, which would endanger a common 
understanding and thus undermine legal certainty. The definition of netting should refer to a 
mechanism under which all or some of the following elements occur: 
   the  netting  mechanism  is  triggered  by  the  occurrence  (often  not  automatically  but 
requiring notice by the other party) of a termination event, which can be defined under 
the netting agreement; 
   termination  of  unsettled  financial  contracts;  however,  the  netting  agreement  itself 
should not be terminated, so that the netting mechanism can perform properly; 
   acceleration of payment and delivery obligations under these contracts so as to make 
them immediately due; 
   valuation of the terminated contracts (other than payment obligations but extending to 
foreign exchange); 
   computation of a net amount in a single currency reflecting the value of the terminated 
financial contracts as well as the mutual rights and obligations that were already due.  
Article  31(3)(j)  of  the  Geneva  Securities  Convention  combines  these  elements  to  form  a 
functional definition of netting and delivers a blueprint for a possible future definition used in a 
general instrument on netting:  
‘Close-out netting provision’ means a provision of a collateral agreement, or of a set of 
connected agreements of which a collateral agreement forms part, under which, on the 
occurrence of an enforcement event, either or both of the following occur, or may at the 
election of the collateral taker occur, whether through the operation of netting or set-off 
or otherwise:  
(i) the respective obligations of the parties are accelerated so as to be immediately due 
and expressed as an obligation to pay an amount representing their estimated current 
value, or are terminated and replaced by an obligation to pay such an amount;  
(ii) an account is taken of what is due from each party to the other in relation to such 
obligations, and a net sum equal to the balance of the account is payable by the party 
from whom the larger amount is due to the other party.   28 
B.  Agreement 
An international instrument, with a view to guaranteeing broad application, should consider a 
netting  agreement  being  a  privately  negotiated  contract,  as  opposed  to  referring  solely  to 
standardised netting agreements included in documentation provided by market associations. 
Special regard would need to be given to formal requirements, in particular whether it makes 
sense to prescribe any requirements other than that of written form. The instrument should 
address  the  issue  of  validity  of  umbrella  agreements  combining  two  or  more  netting 
agreements. 
Despite the fact that netting agreements are usually part of standardised legal documentation 
(‘master  agreements’)  provided  by  financial  market  associations  (cf.  supra),  the  netting 
agreement itself is in principle a contract privately negotiated on the grounds of freedom of 
contract. Not much would therefore need to be said in an international instrument as regards 
the characteristics of the 'agreement'.  
However, it might be worth considering whether the common practice tying together several 
master agreements between identical parties ('umbrella-agreement') merits specific definition, 
so as to eliminate uncertainty with respect to the validity of such umbrella agreements. This is 
particularly important since an umbrella agreement might also alter the terms of the bundled 
netting agreements. From the point of view of contractual law principles, there would seem to 
be no problematic issues arising from this practice. Yet it would appear to make sense to include 
a  clarification  regarding  umbrella  agreements  since,  while  their  mechanism  does  result  in  a 
computation of the amounts resulting from the operation of the netting agreements they cover, 
they  do  not  on  the  other  hand  net  the  financial  contracts  themselves.  In  other  words,  an 
umbrella agreement permits a further netting to occur after netting has taken place under each 
individual netting agreement. 
As netting agreements are supposed to be valid in the event of insolvency of one of the parties, 
they  have  some  impact  on  third  parties,  notably  the  unsecured  creditors  in  an  insolvency 
proceeding (cf. supra). Consequently, consideration might be given to evidentiary requirements. 
However, in a cross-border context, requirements such as notarisation, registration or filing with 
a public register risk being mishandled because they are not harmonised. Mishandling any filing 
or similar procedure may result in instant invalidity of the netting agreement on formal grounds 
even where the parties unanimously agree with its terms. Where such a defect is not detected 
until  the  moment  in  which  one  of  the  parties  defaults,  the  resulting  damage  is  potentially 
disastrous. An international instrument should therefore settle on netting agreements being 
evidenced in writing or in any legally equivalent manner, this latter element being important so 
as to include not only e-mail but also electronic messaging applied within settlement systems or 
similar networks of market participants.   29
C.  Financial contracts 
An international instrument should be broad-based, allowing netting agreements to include all 
types  of  financial  contract.  In  defining  the  term  ‘financial  contract’,  all  options  should  be 
discussed, i.e. whether a comprehensive list, a generic, functional description or a combination 
of both should be contemplated. 
There are basically two questions: first, which types of financial contract should be covered, and, 
secondly,  which  technique  should  be  employed  in  defining  that  material  scope  in  an 
international instrument. 
The need to cater for the enforceability of netting arrangements is probably most urgently felt in 
relation to repurchase agreements and derivatives. The background to this is that, flowing from 
the logic inherent in such instruments, the credit risk associated with such contracts and hence, 
the potential exposure in the event of default of the counterparty, may be particularly high. 
However,  derivatives  and  repos  are  not  the  only  financial  contracts where  the  reduction  of 
counterparty credit risk makes sense. There are several other types of financial contract that are 
characterised by the phenomenon of life-threatening gross and much smaller net exposure that 
could be absorbed in the event of counterparty failure.  
To counter this, it is advisable to opt for the inclusion of the entire range of financial contracts, in 
particular:  
   derivatives 
   sale, repurchase and lending agreements relating to securities or commodities; 
   agreements providing collateral or security; 
   agreements regarding the maintenance of financial instruments in accounts for the 
counterparty, on clearing and settlement of financial instruments or on safekeeping 
of physical certificates
19. 
It is particularly important to give thought to the possibility of including collateral arrangements 
in the range of eligible financial contracts.
20 If these are included, the law would allow collateral 
                                                 
19 In the context of clearing, settlement and safekeeping of financial instruments, great attention needs to be 
paid  to  the  conflict-of-laws  regime.  The  law  applicable  to  the  safekeeping  etc.  of  securities  ('proprietary 
aspects') is in many jurisdictions determined in accordance with the lex rei sitae principle, which differs from 
conflict-of-laws  rules  applicable  to  contracts.  Consequently,  the  inclusion  of  this  type  of  arrangement 
containing  proprietary  aspects  as  eligible  financial  contracts  in  a  netting  agreement  cannot  influence  the 
distinction in respect of conflict-of-laws and therefore cannot alter the substantive law governing the holding 
and disposition of securities. Similar considerations apply to dispositions effected under a lending agreement. 
20 Articles 2(1)(n) and 7 of the EU Financial Collateral Directive contain a specific rule protecting (only) collateral 
provided  on  the  basis  of  a title  transfer. Cash  or  securities  provided under  such a title-transfer  collateral 
agreement can be included in the netting mechanism together with the secured claims. The Directive’s scope 
relating to netting is therefore limited and netting is not generally protected under EU law, which leads to a 
heterogeneous picture regarding the accommodation of netting in the EU. Some jurisdictions do not extend the 
enforceability of  netting agreements  beyond  their  use  in  connection with  a  collateral  arrangement;  other 
jurisdictions allow netting in a much broader manner.    30 
provided  in  connection  with  a  netting  agreement  to  be  itself  included  in  the  close-out 
mechanism. Otherwise, the underlying financial contracts would be subject to netting and result 
in  one  single  payment  obligation,  whereas  the  collateral  provided  in  connection  with  the 
underlying contracts (and these may potentially represent huge amounts) would need to be 
wound up separately. However, the intention is not to change the requirements for validity and 
enforceability  of  collateral  interests.  Therefore,  the  possibility  of  including  related  collateral 
arrangements in the netting agreement applies only to those collateral interests established in 
accordance with the applicable law. 
The second issue relates to the technical definition of the material scope of eligible contracts. 
Although there is a common understanding in the financial market regarding the content of the 
various financial contracts listed above, the legal terminology in this area is heterogeneous. An 
international instrument would therefore need to take a consistent approach in setting out the 
material scope of eligible contracts – uncertainty regarding the scope could easily translate into 
uncertainty as to whether the netting agreement is enforceable or not.  
There are basically three options to define the material scope as covering all financial contracts. 
The first option is a generic clause combining the description of the categories of agreement 
with a description of the substrate of the agreement. Categories would include in particular 
derivatives (options, futures, swaps, forwards and suchlike), sale, repurchase, lending, provision 
of  collateral,  and  acceptance  for  clearing,  settlement  or  safekeeping.  The  substrate  of  the 
agreement commonly relates to the categories of foreign currency, securities (shares, bonds), 
commodities including metals, indices, prices (emission allowances, freight rates, etc.), and other 
elements (credit default, weather, etc.).  
The second option would consist in setting out a comprehensive list of all financial contracts that 
are currently in common use in the financial markets. 
The third option would be to refer the task of defining which types of financial contract are 
covered to the national competent authorities such as central banks and supervisory authorities.  
Any  of  these  three  options  entail  advantages  and  disadvantages  in  terms  of  certainty  of 
interpretation,  consistency  of  coverage  and  flexibility  to  accommodate  new  market 
developments. Whereas the third option probably offers the best results in terms of certainty of 
material scope, it is also liable to produce a very high degree of inconsistency since the different 
national authorities may take a narrower or wider view of what the scope is, so that the global 
view  of  the  material  scope  may  end  up  resembling  a  patchwork.  The  second  option  would 
provide for a consistent scope, but the terms employed in the definitions, which are basically 
market  terms,  would  be  open  to  some  residual  margin  of  interpretation,  and  as  netting 
agreements are privately negotiated, the definitions in a list provided by market associations are 
likewise open to amendment. Furthermore, a fixed list would be unable to accommodate new 
market developments. This last problem can only be countered by providing an opening clause 
in  addition  to  the  list  of  financial  contracts.  Such  an  opening  clause  would  in  its  substance 
correspond to a generic description of the material scope, which is the first option.     31
Ultimately, therefore, a generic definition is probably the appropriate solution, and a detailed list 
of known financial contracts should rather figure in any explanatory text that might accompany 
the instrument. In developing the definition, great attention will have to be paid to neutrality of 
language and functionality of concepts, since market terms such as, for example, 'forward' or 
'spot' might be interpreted differently in different jurisdictions. 
IV.  The principle of enforceability of netting agreements 
An  international  instrument  could  have  as  one  of  its  centrepieces  a  rule  protecting  the 
enforceability of netting agreements in both insolvency and pre-insolvency situations. There are 
various possible approaches and Article 33(1) and (3) of the Geneva Securities Convention might 
serve as a blueprint for such a rule. 
Enhancing the enforceability of netting agreements aims primarily at the case of insolvency of 
the  counterparty.  However,  despite  the  fact  that  insolvency  netting  is  the  most  prominent 
situation, it would need to be made clear that netting agreements should also be enforceable 
outside an insolvency proceeding.  
Attempts have been made to achieve this result by means of a conflict-of-laws mechanism. For 
example, Article 25 of the EU Banks Winding Up Directive prescribes that ‘netting agreements 
shall be governed solely by the law of the contract that governs such agreements’. However, the 
main legal risks affecting the enforceability of netting agreements arise under the insolvency law 
applicable  to  a  defaulting  counterparty,  rather  than  the  governing  law  of  the  contract. 
Therefore,  the  aforementioned  approach  is  not  sufficiently  clear  as  to  whether  instruments 
available under the insolvency procedure of the lex concursus are effectively ruled out. At the 
same time, the law governing the netting agreement is not necessarily netting-friendly, and the 
interaction between this law and the lex concursus is not certain. Thus, this approach, unless 
clarified, appears unsatisfactory for the purpose of overcoming obstacles to the enforceability of 
netting agreements in insolvency.
21  
A first possible approach to harmonising the substantive law would consist in specifying, on a 
case-by-case basis, which legal rules (insolvency procedure and others) should not prejudice the 
enforceability of netting agreements. The clear advantage of this approach would be that all 
intended consequences, i.e., which general legal rules would be overridden by the enforceability 
of netting agreements, would be written black on white in the law.  
Another  approach  would  be  to  include  in  the  substantive  law  a  general  provision  that  the 
enforceability of netting agreements is not precluded by any rule of the law, including insolvency 
law. The clear advantage of this approach would be that there would be no risk of failing to list 
one or other problematic rule. It is this approach that was adopted in Chapter 5 of the Geneva 
Securities Convention, since its Article 33(1), (3) prescribes that:  
                                                 
21 European Financial Markets Lawyers Group (EFMLG), Protection for bilateral insolvency set-off and netting 
agreements under EC law, October 2004, para. 134.   32 
‘at the occurrence of an enforcement event […] a close-out netting provision may be 
operated’; and  
‘[…] a close out provision may be operated […] notwithstanding the commencement or 
continuation of an insolvency proceeding in relation to the collateral provider or the 
collateral taker.’ 
Consideration might be given to the idea that an international instrument focusing solely on 
netting might benefit from achieving both, illustration through enumeration in order to facilitate 
a  common  understanding  of  potentially  problematic  situations,  based  on  a  general  rule 
guaranteeing comprehensiveness. 
Insofar  as  the  term  ‘insolvency  proceeding’  would  need  to  be  specified,  an  international 
instrument  should  opt  for  a  wide  definition. Given  the  closeness  of the  subject-matter,  the 
definition of insolvency agreed upon in the Geneva Securities Convention appears to be a good 
starting point. 
V.  Enforceability against a multi-branch counterparty 
An international instrument could develop mechanisms capable of improving the enforceability 
of a netting agreement against a multi-branch entity in the jurisdiction where the insolvency 
proceeding was opened, by alleviating the effects of ring-fencing in the context of resolution 
measures in respect of a foreign branch. 
As long as such a multi-branch entity is solvent, multi-branch netting does not seem to pose any 
particular legal difficulties. However, as soon as a multi-branch counterparty becomes insolvent, 
the enforceability of the netting agreement very much depends on the consistent interaction of 
the  different  insolvency  laws  that  might  be  applicable  to  the  head  office  and  its  foreign 
branches,  in  particular  where  separate  insolvency  proceedings  are  opened  in  two  or  more 
jurisdictions. 
Some jurisdictions provide for ring-fencing of the assets and/or liabilities of an insolvent local 
branch of a foreign entity. Where assets are ring-fenced, they may be ‘torn out’ of the bundle of 
financial  contracts  included  under  a  netting  agreement,  which  might  block  the  netting 
mechanism or render it worthless. Consequently, in order to improve the functioning of cross-
border multi-branch netting agreements, the possibility of domestic limitations on ring-fencing 
of rights flowing from a financial contract included in a multi-branch netting agreement should 
be explored.     33
VI.  Accommodation of regulatory powers 
An international instrument could develop rules to guarantee that a moratorium imposed by a 
public authority on the enforceability of netting agreements and the transfer of a bundle of 
financial contracts to a solvent bridge institution are properly recognised by the private and 
insolvency law foreign to the jurisdiction under which the moratorium is imposed and/or under 
which the transfer is effected. Such a solution would probably need to combine conflict-of-laws 
and substantive law provisions. 
Newly developed regulatory powers in the context of the resolution of financial institutions as 
described above carry the risk that the rights of the solvent parties or third parties might be 
affected  by  a  moratorium  on  netting  agreements  or  by  the  transfer  to  a  solvent  bridge 
institution of all financial contracts bundled under a netting agreement. In a purely domestic 
context, national law could relatively easily resolve these problems, as the law providing for the 
special regulatory powers would simultaneously state the private and insolvency law effects of 
both moratorium and transfer, providing for a framework that is coherent from the domestic 
point of view.  
However,  some  financial  contracts  that  include proprietary aspects  might  be  governed by  a 
foreign law, depending on the applicable conflict-of-laws rule. Certain jurisdictions might allow 
for an analysis under which the transfer of such financial contracts forms part of the transfer of 
the entire estate and apply the law to which the estate has the closest connection. Others might, 
as regards in particular proprietary aspects, follow different rules, e.g. the lex rei sitae principle 
(or in relation to intermediated securities, the place of the relevant intermediary principle) under 
which the foreign law would be applicable.  
Moreover,  in  the  event  of  a  cross-border  insolvency,  there  might  be  the  complication  of 
simultaneous application of the universality and territoriality principles on the respective sides of 
the border. The solution here probably lies in a combination of substantive law harmonisation 
and  accommodation  of  the  differences  in  conflict-of-laws  rules.  An  international  instrument 
would need, as a first step, to identify combined solutions in this sense. As the relevant issues 
are  unlikely  to  be  solved  on  a  non-binding  basis,  consideration  should  be  given  to  the 
development of a binding Convention on this matter. 
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